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Jones: The Alien Tort Statute and Corporate Liability

THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND CORPORATE
LIABILITY: REBUTTING THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL PRESUMPTION POSTKIOBEL
Maxwell R. Jones
INTRODUCTION
On April 11, 2001, the United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia
(AUC), a right wing paramilitary group, went on a killing spree
throughout the Naya region in western Columbia, using guns,
machetes, and chainsaws to kill thirty-two people.1 Evidence of such
brutal violence, coupled with funding from regional drug cartels, led
the U.S. State Department to classify the AUC as a terrorist
organization in 2005.2 However, drug money was not the AUC’s
only source of revenue. In 2007, Chiquita Brands International, best
known for their bananas, admitted to paying out nearly $2 million
directly to the AUC in areas near Chiquita owned banana plantations
where the AUC exercised control.3 As a result, Chiquita paid fines
totaling $25 million dollars and served five years of corporate
probation because of payment to the AUC.4 When Columbian
citizens sought damages from Chiquita in 2012, related to AUC
violence in the early 2000s, they sought damages in the Southern
District of Florida under a statute dating back to 1789: the Alien Tort
Statute.5

J.D. Candidate, Georgia State University College of Law, 2016; B.A. Sewanee: The University
of the South, 2012. Many thanks to the editors of the Georgia State Law Review for their help and
support this year. Thanks to Marshall and Pharan Evans for helpful comments and support. Finally,
thanks to my parents, Cliff and Victoria Jones, and my sister McKenzie for their love and support.
1. THE SAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TERRORISM 610 (C. Gus Martin ed., 2d ed. 2011).
2. Nat’l Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Terrorist Organization
Profile: United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC), START.UMD.EDU, http://www.start.umd.edu/
tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=126 (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
3. Kevin
Bohn,
Chiquita:
$25M
Fine
for
Terror
Payments,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2007/BUSINESS/09/11/chiquita.terrorism (last updated Sept. 11, 2007, 11:21
PM).
4. Id.
5. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1187 (11th Cir. 2014).
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This Note focuses on corporate liability for companies with U.S.
citizenship under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). Part I discusses the
history of the ATS through its revitalization in Filartiga v. PenaIrala6 in 1980.7 Part II discusses the rise of litigation under the ATS
from 1980 until the reach of the ATS was restricted by the United
States Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain8 and Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum9 in 2013.10 Part III outlines how circuit
courts have dealt with corporate liability under the ATS since 2013’s
Kiobel decision.11 Part IV offers a proposal for interpreting the
language of Kiobel and offers a concise set of factors for district
courts to use in determining when to properly exercise jurisdiction
over a claim brought by aliens against U.S. corporations for
allegations of torts committed abroad.12
I. BACKGROUND
The Judiciary Act of 1789 enacted the ATS to prevent a U.S.
citizen’s tort from implicating the U.S. as a sovereign nation in an
international conflict.13 In the late eighteenth century, a country that
failed to redress a citizen’s tort was held responsible for the citizen’s
tort.14 The ATS provides in its entirety, “The district courts shall
6. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
7. See discussion infra Part I. The ATS stood “largely dormant” for almost two centuries after its
enactment in 1789. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x
7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Only two district courts invoked jurisdiction during that two-century period. See
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795)
(No. 1607).
8. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697–98 (2004).
9. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). For a general discussion of the
history of the ATS through the Supreme Court’s seminal decisions in Sosa and Kiobel see Michael D.
Ramsey, Returning the Alien Tort Statute to Obscurity, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 67 (2013); see also
Kedar S. Bhatia, Comment, Reconsidering the Purely Jurisdictional View of the Alien Tort Statute, 27
EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 447, 469–77 (2013).
10. See discussion infra Part II.
11. See discussion infra Part III. For a critical analysis on the first Kiobel opinion out of the Second
Circuit—before the Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling on Kiobel (Kiobel II)—see Matthew E. Danforth,
Note, Corporate Civil Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: Exploring its Possibility and Jurisdictional
Limitations, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 659 (2011).
12. See discussion infra Part IV.
13. Bhatia, supra note 9, at 453–54.
14. Id.; see also Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L.
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have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”15 Although the Statute is only thirty-five words, much
judicial and academic ink has come from its interpretation.16 The
ATS was largely dormant from its enactment in 1789 until Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala in 1980.17 Filartiga involved a suit in the Eastern
District of New York between aliens for events that took place
entirely in Paraguay.18 The grant of jurisdiction to hear the case in
Filartiga paved the way for the ATS as a vehicle for aliens to bring
lawsuits in U.S. district courts. Typically, these suits alleged human
rights violations in the developing world, which violated the “law of
nations.”19
REV. 830, 847–48 (2006). Professor Lee details how the ATS was enacted to provide redress for
common law torts committed by private actors—including aliens—with a United States sovereign
nexus. Id. at 830. Professor Lee draws on provisions of the 1789 Judiciary Act, the 1790 Crimes Acts,
Article III of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court decision Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, to reason that
the ATS was enacted to allow aliens to sue in federal district court to prevent the U.S. from potentially
getting dragged into conflicts with other countries whose citizens are the victims of a U.S. citizen’s
torts. Id. The importance of finding the statutory meaning at the time of enactment becomes important in
light of the Supreme Court’s first ruling on the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, where the Court
looked to the intent of the framers and the statutory meaning at the time of enactment to determine
whether a claim is valid under the ATS. Id. at 833.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For a discussion on the history surrounding the enactment of the ATS
see Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 445 (2011). The ATS was enacted in part in response to the state’s failure to uphold the
rights of British creditors under the Paris Peace Treaty 1783 and the state’s failure to redress acts of
violence by citizens against British subjects. Id. at 466. On a larger scale, the ATS was designed to
avoid U.S. responsibility for its citizens’ law of nations violations. Id. at 469–70.
16. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub., 726 F.2d 774, 812–16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring); Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002);
Ann-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J.
INT’L L. 461 (1989); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to
the “Originalists,” 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996); Robert C. Thompson et al.,
Translating Unocal: The Expanding Web of Liability for Business Entities Implicated in International
Crimes, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 841 (2009).
17. Only two suits involved the ATS in the nearly two-century span between 1789 and 1989. See
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 859 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795)
(No. 1607).
18. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). The suit in Filartiga involved one
Paraguay national bringing an action against another, while both were in the U.S., alleging that the
defendant, the former Inspector General of police in Paraguay, tortured and killed the son of the plaintiff
in Paraguay because of the plaintiff’s political affiliation. Id. Reversing the decision of the district court,
the Second Circuit held the Plaintiff’s claim for arbitrary detention did constitute a tort in violation of
the laws of nations within the meaning of the statute. Id.at 884.
19. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013) (a class action on
behalf of Nigerians alleging Shell aided and abetted the Nigerian government in violating the law of
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Although litigation under the ATS began in the 1980s, the U.S.
Supreme Court did not hear an ATS case until Sosa v. AlvarezMachain in 2004.20 Sosa involved a Mexican national’s suit against
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials and a Mexican
national who aided the DEA in bringing the plaintiff to Texas,
against his will, for a criminal trial.21 In Sosa, the Court clarified that
the ATS was not only a jurisdictional statute, but also provided a
cause of action based on violations of international norms that are
“specific, universal, and obligatory.”22 The Court also instructed
lower courts to account for practical considerations when exercising
jurisdiction over international claims because of the potential for
disputes with other nations and conflicts of law, considerations often
nations by suppressing opposition to oil exploration and drilling in the Ogoni Niger River Delta); Doe v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (plaintiffs were fifteen Indonesian villagers
complaining that Defendant Exxon’s security forces committed murder, torture, sexual assault, battery,
and false imprisonment in violation of the ATS in the U.S. and Indonesia), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7
(D.C. Cir. 2013); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 256, 261 (2d
Cir. 2009) (Sudanese nationals complaining that Defendant aided and abetted the Sudanese government
in committing genocide by financing arms and military operations to suppress a movement to
nationalize oil production).
20. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004); see also Bhatia, supra note 9, at 469
(explaining that although the statute existed for 215 years the Supreme Court did not address it until
2004). The Supreme Court was forced to deal with the question of whether the ATS was a purely
jurisdictional statute or actually a new cause of action. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697, 712. The Court held that
the Statute was not only a jurisdictional statute, but also a new cause of action under the “law of
nations.” Id. at 712. The majority reasoned that if the statute was purely jurisdictional, it would have
been “stillborn” at birth, given the fact that there was otherwise no secondary statute authorizing a cause
of action. Id. at 714. The majority recognized that actions that would violate the “law of nations” in
1789 include piracy, actions against ambassadors, and violations of safe conduct. Id. at 715. The Court
not only looked to the history of the law of nations, but also provided for potential new causes of action
as long as courts “require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the eighteenth-century paradigms we have recognized.” Id. at 725.
21. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698. The criminal suit brought by the DEA was eventually dismissed and Sosa
brought charges against both the DEA and Alvarez, a Mexican national, under the ATS. Id.
22. Id. at 732. The Court explained that these specifically defined and widely accepted “international
norms” must also involve practical considerations with “an element of judgment about the practical
consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts.” Id. at 732–33. Further,
these causes of action must reflect the “historical paradigms” that were familiar at the time of the ATS’s
enactment. Id. at 732. Historical paradigms included behavior that would violate the law of nations in
1789: piracy, actions against ambassadors, and violations of safe conduct. Id. at 694. Causes of action
that fit within historical paradigms was the first category for a cause of action under the ATS. Id. at 732.
The second cause of action under the ATS involved the violation of current international law, requiring
(1) heightened specificity in pleading and (2) widespread international acceptance. Id. at 732; see also
Bhatia, supra note 9, at 471.
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left to the other branches of government under the political question
doctrine.23 Thus, in order to state a claim post-Sosa, a plaintiff must
state a violation of an international norm that is “specific, universal,
and obligatory,” and do so in a way that does not violate the political
question doctrine.24
In light of this fact-driven inquiry, lower courts struggled to
determine what actions violated a “specific, universal, and
obligatory” international norm, and comported with the practical
considerations outlined in Sosa.25 Furthermore, the Court in Sosa
failed to clarify the scope of corporate liability, if any, under the
ATS.26 Following Sosa, the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits all
held that corporations could be held liable under the ATS.27
However, the Second and D.C. circuits held that corporations were
not liable under the ATS because the “law of nations”28 is applicable
only to states and men, not juridical persons such as corporations.29
23. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (“The potential [foreign policy] implications . . . of recognizing . . . causes
[under the ATS] should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretions of the Legislative
and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs.”).
24. See generally Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing the modern political question
doctrine).
25. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, addressed some of the
practical concerns in a concurring opinion, noting that “[t]oday international law will sometimes
similarly reflect not only substantive agreement as to certain universally condemned behavior but also
procedural agreement that universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute a subset of that behavior.” Id. at 762
(Breyer, J., concurring).
26. Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to
hold corporations liable under the ATS) aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), with Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (allowing corporate liability under the statute), vacated, 527 F. App’x
7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
27. See Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 765 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Romero v.
Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”) (emphasis added). Under the “law of nations,” corporations are not held liable for human rights
violations, as opposed to individuals or state actors. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d
111, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Customary international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate
liability for international crimes, and no international tribunal has ever held a corporation liable for a
violation of the law of nations.”), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). The Second Circuit based their holding
on the international jurisprudence post-Nuremberg trials that held states and individual men as
chargeable with human rights violations, but not juridical persons such as corporations. Id. at 119, 125–
32 (citing The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), opened for signature July 17,
1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1016; The Nuremberg Trial (United States v. Goering), 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (Int’l
Military Trib. at Nuremberg 1946); and 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 33, 119 (Sir Robert
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In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court again addressed the ATS in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, but still did not address corporate
liability under the statute.30 Kiobel involved a claim by Nigerian
nationals against a Dutch corporation for events that took place in
Africa.31 With the concern for potential conflicts of law in mind, the
Court limited the reach of the ATS, holding that “[t]he presumption
against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS . . . .”32 In
other words, the ATS presumably does not apply to events that take
place outside of U.S. territory. Plaintiffs can overcome this
presumption, however, when “claims touch and concern the territory
of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”33 What constitutes
“sufficient force” to rebut the extraterritorial presumption is still
unclear.34 Concerning corporations, the Court stated, “[c]orporations
are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say
that [a] mere corporate presence suffices” to displace the
presumption against extraterritorial application.35 Although the Court
Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996)).
29. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 83; Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 120 (holding a corporation was not liable
because looking at the jurisprudence of international law, notably the trials at Nuremberg, “offenses
against the law of nations (i.e., customary international law) for violations of human rights can be
charged against States and against individual men and women but not against but not against juridical
persons such as corporations”). Judge Leval concurred in judgment in Kiobel, but disagreed with the
denial of corporate liability, reasoning that although corporations were not subjects under International
law, they nonetheless had obligations, and were bound to them. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 179–80 (Leval, J.,
concurring).
30. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662, 1669 (2013).
31. Id. at 1662. More specifically, Kiobel involved a suit filed by several exiled Nigerians living in
the U.S. in 2002 against Shell Oil and its various subsidiaries. Id. The complaint alleged various human
rights violations in connection with Nigerian military forces who in the mid-1990s were responsible for
violently suppressing the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, a popular movement seeking
to prevent oil pollution in the region. Id. at 1662–63. For an overview of the conflict itself see Joshua P.
Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of Transnational Corporations, and the
Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT’L L. J. 261, 264–71 (1997).
32. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. The Court noted that this presumption “serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international
discord.” Id. at 1664 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)).
33. Id. at 1669.
34. See, e.g., Bhatia, supra note 9, at 477 (explaining how “Kiobel raised as many new questions as
it answered”).
35. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that if the statute was meant to
more liberally exercise jurisdiction over extraterritorial action, then it is up to Congress to enact a statute
that is more specific than the ATS. Id. Although the Court does not lay out specific factors that would
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narrowed the ATS in Kiobel, it did not clarify what factors, in
addition to corporate presence, constitute sufficient force to rebut the
presumption against extraterritorial application and hear the case.36
Since the Kiobel decision in April of 2013, circuit courts look to
different factors to analyze what is sufficient force to displace the
presumption against extraterritoriality for corporations.37 Only three
months after Kiobel, the Second Circuit held that where plaintiffs fail
to allege that any relevant conduct takes place in the U.S., Kiobel
categorically bars all claims under the ATS.38 If the conduct occurs
abroad, foreign plaintiffs can never sufficiently overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality, even if the defendant is an
American citizen or corporation.39
The Eleventh Circuit further limited the ATS in July of 2014,
holding that even when the defendant is a U.S. corporation, and part
of the relevant conduct alleged by aliens took place in the U.S.,

overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, Justice Alito alluded to a heightened standard,
“[T]he presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated
to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.” Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring)
(quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010)). Justice Alito further proposed
that the defendant’s domestic conduct itself must violate an international law norm. Id.
36. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the Court in Kiobel left “significant
questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute” unanswered, which “may
require some further elaboration and explanation.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
37. Compare Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding
plaintiffs did not state a valid ATS claim for allegations of torture and murder in Colombia, but financed
and overseen by a U.S. corporation), with Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–
31 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding plaintiffs did state a valid ATS claim for allegations of torture in Iraq, but
financed and overseen by a U.S. corporation).
38. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013). The plaintiffs in Balintulo argued
that whether the relevant conduct occurred abroad is only one factor of a multi-factor test, and that the
ATS reaches extraterritorial conduct when the actor is an American citizen, in this case a corporate
citizen. Id. The Second Circuit disagreed, “The Supreme Court expressly held that claims under the ATS
cannot be brought for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other
than the United States.” Id.; see also Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 54 (2d
Cir. 2014) (dismissing plaintiffs’ ATS claim against defendant corporation because all of the alleged
conduct took place in Bangladesh).
39. For a discussion on viable alternatives in light of these ATS restrictions, see Roger P. Alford,
Human Rights after Kiobel: Choice of Law and the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, 63 EMORY
L.J. 1089 (2014). Given the jurisdictional hurdle under the ATS, some have offered alternatives to the
statute under the theory of transnational tort litigation. Transnational tort litigation consists of pleading a
human rights violation as a traditional domestic or foreign tort violation, where there is no presumption
of extraterritoriality. Id. at 1095 n.13. In this context, courts apply tort laws based on traditional choice
of law models, many of which are already in use in the context of international terrorism. Id.
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jurisdiction under the ATS is still improper.40 In Cardona v. Chiquita
Brands International, the Eleventh Circuit noted that because the
complaint did not state that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, the
presumption against extraterritoriality barred an ATS claim.41
However, the plaintiffs in Cardona also alleged that Chiquita
corporate officers oversaw and financed the alleged conduct from
their corporate headquarters, in the U.S., for the purpose of carrying
out the conduct abroad.42 In a lengthy dissent, Judge Beverly Martin
noted that in stark contrast to Kiobel, the plaintiffs in Cardona were
not seeking to hold the defendant vicariously liable for actions of its
agents or subsidiaries, nor were the plaintiffs alleging tortious
conduct that took place exclusively on foreign soil.43 Judge Martin
reasoned that because of these two important factual distinctions, the
claims here were properly stated under the ATS.44 In addressing
Judge Martin’s dissent, the majority reasoned that because there were
no allegations that torture occurred on U.S. territory, the claims were
barred under Kiobel.45
The Fourth Circuit took a more liberal view of jurisdiction in Al
Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology.46 In Al Shimari, four Iraqi
40. Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189.
41. Id. at 1189–90.
42. Id. at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1194 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Martin further supports her reasoning with the
legislative history of the ATS, namely the concern of the framers that the U.S. would “fail to meet the
expectations of the international community were we to allow U.S. citizens to travel to foreign shores
and commit violations of the law of nations with impunity.” Id. at 1193 (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)). Judge Martin draws further on several
historical references to support her statutory interpretation, citing Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss legal
philosopher from the eighteenth century: “A sovereign who refuses to repair the evil done by one of his
subjects, or to punish the criminal, or, finally to deliver him up, makes himself in a way an accessory to
the deed and becomes responsible for it.” Id. at 1193 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND
TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS bk. II, ch. VI § 77 (1758) (Charles G. Fenwick trans.,
1916) (emphasis added)). It is precisely this responsibility for the actions of a citizen that Judge Martin
argues the founders were attempting to avoid, and exactly the same kind of conduct that was at issue in
the case. Id. at 1194 (Martin, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1191. The majority further states as dicta that although allowing U.S. citizens to travel
abroad and violate international law with impunity may raise international diplomatic concerns, such
concerns are vested in the purview of the executive and legislative branch, in managing foreign affairs
and in legislating laws to deal with such concerns. Id.
46. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014).
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citizens brought a claim for torture, in violation of international law,
against a U.S. defense contractor stemming from the Abu Ghraib
prison scandal.47 The defendants in Al Shimari made the exact same
argument as the Eleventh Circuit majority in Cardona: the plaintiffs
alleged only conduct that occurred outside of U.S. territory, so their
claims should be dismissed under Kiobel.48 The Fourth Circuit
disagreed, reasoning that a “more nuanced analysis” of all factors is
required, rather than a bright-line rule.49 The Fourth Circuit found
jurisdiction by broadly interpreting whether “the ‘relevant conduct’
alleged in the claims ‘touch[es] and concern[s] the territory of the
United States with sufficient force to displace the
presumption . . . .’”50 Unlike the relevant conduct in Kiobel, which
only touched the U.S. with “mere corporate presence,” the plaintiffs
here alleged substantial ties with the U.S., including the performance
of a contract with the federal government.51 The Fourth Circuit
explicitly rejected a bright-line rule that conduct, which occurs
exclusively abroad, bars an ATS claim per se.52 The Fourth Circuit
cited four important factors in rebutting the extraterritorial
presumption: (1) the U.S. citizenship of the corporate defendant, (2)
the U.S. citizenship of the corporation’s employees involved in the
conduct, and (3) a contract between the defendant and the U.S.
government.53 The Fourth Circuit’s approach to an ATS claim, and in
accordance with Kiobel, is directly at odds with how the Eleventh
Circuit interpreted a nearly identical fact pattern.54 Reconciling these
47. Id. at 521.
48. Id. at 520.
49. Id. at 528.
50. Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)).
51. Id. at 528.
52. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528. “[I]t is not sufficient merely to say that because the actual injuries
were inflicted abroad, the claims do not touch and concern United States territory.” Id.
53. Id. at 530. The Court disposed of the practical considerations regarding conflict of laws and
foreign policy implications because the defendant was a corporate citizen of the U.S. Id. (citing Sexual
Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322–24 (D. Mass. 2013)) (reasoning Kiobel does not
bar claims against an American citizen, for practical reasons at least, because a foreign national is not
dragged into U.S. courts).
54. Compare Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding
plaintiffs did not state a valid ATS claim for allegations of torture and murder in Colombia when
injuries were financed and overseen by a U.S. corporation), with Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530–31
(holding plaintiffs did state a valid ATS claim for allegations of torture in Iraq when injuries were
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approaches, and determining the most important factors that “rebut
the presumption of extraterritoriality,” is vital for district courts
ruling, plaintiffs seeking recovery, and general counsel for any
company with an international reach. This Note offers such a
proposal.
II. ANALYSIS
The key question in determining corporate liability under the ATS
is whether conduct that is a violation of the law of nations
sufficiently touches and concerns the U.S. to rebut the presumption
against extraterritoriality.55 Courts generally look to four factors to
determine if conduct sufficiently touches and concerns the U.S. to
rebut the extraterritorial presumption: (1) the nature and place of the
conduct itself, (2) the citizenship of the corporate defendant, (3) the
connection between the conduct and tort-feasor, and (4) the political
question doctrine.56 Some courts view the nature and place of the acts
themselves as the dispositive factor in exercising jurisdiction.57
Others view all the factors together, comprising different prongs of a
multi-factor test.58 Determining how these factors relate is the scope
of this analysis.59
A. The Conduct Itself
Undoubtedly, the conduct itself is the most important factor of
analysis, and for some courts is alone determinative.60 Conduct
sufficient to state a claim must (1) be a violation of the law of nations
and (2) have a sufficient connection with the United States.61 The
financed and overseen by a U.S. corporation).
55. See supra notes 32–33.
56. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530–31.
57. See, e.g., Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189; Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir.
2013).
58. See, e.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 533.
59. See discussion infra Part II.A–C.
60. See, e.g., Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 190 (holding that even if a defendant is a corporate citizen, “if all
the relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under Kiobel”).
61. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669
(2013)).
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second element, a sufficient U.S. connection, ultimately determines
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality is overcome.62
1. Relevant Conduct and Acts Must Violate the Laws of Nations
Under the ATS, the acts themselves must be “in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”63 Traditionally,
torture, genocide, mass rape, and extrajudicial killings are
specifically defined norms of international character, which are
sufficient to constitute a violation of the law of nations.64
The primary issue regarding corporate liability under the law of
nations is that not all actors are liable for the same acts.65 For
example, international law holds state and individual actors liable for
torture while corporations are exempt.66 The Supreme Court noted,
however, that international law imposes only substantive
obligations,67 including genocide, torture, and extrajudicial killings.68
Individual nations decide how to enforce these substantive
obligations under domestic theories of liability.69 Although Sosa
suggests that international law governs who may be liable for
substantive violations, discussing differences between states and
people,70 customary international law only establishes norms of
conduct, not the available remedies for violations of that conduct.71
62. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 529.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
64. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 267 (2d Cir. 2007). To determine
customary international law that is a violation of the laws of nations, courts look to law identified by the
International Court of Justice and international conventions. Id. Any claim based upon the present day
law of nations must rest on a norm of international character that is accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the feature of recognized eighteenth-century paradigms. Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
65. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2014).
66. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Although torture committed by a state is
recognized as a violation of a settled international norm, that cannot be said of private actors.”).
67. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422–23 (1964).
68. See supra note 64.
69. See Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 422–23; see also Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber
Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020 (7th Cir. 2011).
70. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) (“A related consideration [to
determining whether there is a viable cause of action under the ATS] is whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the
defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.”).
71. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir.
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The Supreme Court held that although international law provides no
cause of action to sue corporations, common law does.72 The law of
nations does not create a cause of action, but norms, that when
violated, provide a cause of action under common law.73
Accordingly, federal courts must determine corporate liability “for
the tortious conduct of their agents by reference to federal common
law governing tort remedies.”74
2. The Connection Between the Violations and the Corporate
Defendant
Corporations are traditionally liable under common law for the
tortious conduct of their agents under respondeat superior.75
Corporate liability through agency was an accepted principle of tort
law by the time of the ATS’s enactment in 1789.76 The historical
context of corporate liability through agency is vital given the
Court’s requirement in Sosa that an ATS suit must harmonize with an
international violation that carried liability at the time of the statute’s
enactment.77
Accordingly, plaintiffs typically sue for the actions of corporate
subsidiaries, or individual employees, in ATS litigation under the
agency theory of respondeat superior.78 Corporations can be liable
2013). “[T]he ATS provides federal jurisdiction where the conduct at issue fits a norm qualifying under
Sosa implies that for purposes of affording a remedy, if any, the law of the United States and not the law
of nations must provide the rule of decision in an ATS lawsuit.” Id.
72. Id. (“[T]he fact that the law of nations provides no private right of action to sue corporations
addresses the wrong question and does not demonstrate that corporations are immune from liability
under the ATS. There is no right to sue under the law of nations; no right to sue natural persons,
juridical entities, or states.”).
73. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In interpreting a proper
cause of action under the ATS, Judge Scheindlin stated, “By passing the ATS, Congress created an
action in tort for violations of the law of nations.” Id.
74. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir.
2011), vacated, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
75. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 48, 54 (citing Mayor of Lynn v. Turner, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep.
980 (K.B.); Chestnut Hill & Spring House Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & Rawle 6 (Pa. 1818)).
76. Id. at 47.
77. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). “Federal courts should not recognize
private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite
content and acceptance among civilized nations than the [historical] paradigms familiar when § 1350
was enacted.” Id. at 694.
78. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 774 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (allowing claims against the U.S.
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for the actions of their agents or subsidiaries if they have knowledge
that their dealings facilitated a violation of the law of nations, even if
the companies did not intend for their agents, or their actions, to have
that effect.79 Further, corporations are liable for the actions of those
who they have an exclusive relationship with, or who they exert
economic advantage over, although such actors are not agents in the
traditional sense.80
a. The Citizenship of the Corporate Defendant—Irrelevant in
the Second and Eleventh Circuits
In light of Kiobel, corporate presence, even if substantial, is not
alone sufficient to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality.81 Even in cases where the defendant corporation is
a citizen of the U.S., and not merely present, courts have found U.S.
citizenship insufficient to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality.82 Notably, the Eleventh Circuit, in Cardona v.
Chiquita Brands International, found that even where a defendant
corporation is a U.S. citizen, if the plaintiff does not allege violations
of international law occurred within the U.S., jurisdiction is
improper.83 However, the Eleventh Circuit in Cardona heightened
for the actions of military personal under respondeat superior because the officers were acting within the
scope of their employment, even though their conduct was criminal in nature and only incidentally
authorized by the employer); In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(allowing a suit to proceed under agency theory of respondeat superior under which a corporation was
held liable for the actions of its South African subsidiaries).
79. See, e.g., In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 259–62 (holding that IBM, Ford, and
Daimler could be liable for actions of South African subsidiaries based only on the knowledge that the
sales of their goods to the South African government helped facilitate apartheid in South Africa, even if
the Company did not intend in selling the goods to facilitate that effect).
80. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014). In Nestle, the Ninth
Circuit held defendants may be liable for the acts of their unaffiliated cocoa farms on the Ivory Coast
based on “exclusive buyer/seller relationships” and the defendants’ “economic leverage” over the farms
based on the defendants’ sizeable market share. Id. at 1017. The defendants in Nestle also had
knowledge about Slave labor that existed at these farms based on firsthand visits and reports issued by
domestic and international organizations. Id.
81. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (“Corporations are often
present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices. If
Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.”).
82. See Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014); see also
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2013).
83. Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1191.
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the presumption against extraterritoriality further than the Supreme
Court required in Kiobel.84
The plaintiffs in Cardona alleged a violation of the law of nations
that occurred on U.S. soil when Chiquita allegedly organized and
financed the acts of torture from U.S. soil that eventually occurred in
Columbia.85 The Eleventh Circuit was not persuaded that the
presumption against extraterritoriality was overcome even though the
defendant was a U.S. citizen and some of the alleged conduct
occurred on U.S. soil.86 The most important factor for the Eleventh
Circuit was that the torture itself occurred aboard, even though that
torture was allegedly organized and financed from U.S. soil.87 The
missing territorial connection between the wrongful conduct and the
U.S. was the pivotal factor for the court.88 Judge Martin’s dissent in
Cardona advocated for a broader reading of touch and concern,
stating that claims sufficiently touch and concern the territory of the
U.S. if the defendant aids and abets extraterritorial torts from the
U.S., even if the torts themselves did not occur domestically.89
The Eleventh Circuit further clarified Cardona’s heightened
standard in Baloco v. Drummond.90 Similar to Cardona, Baloco
involved a suit by aliens against a U.S. company.91 The important
84. Id. (holding ATS does not apply even where a corporation is a U.S. citizen, reasoning that U.S.
citizenship does not matter if the alleged conduct took place on foreign soil).
85. Id. at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting). In dissenting, Judge Martin importantly pointed out that
unlike the plaintiffs in Kiobel, the complaint alleged that “Chiquita participated in a campaign of torture
and murder in Columbia by reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of payments and weapons
shipments to Colombian terrorist organizations, all from their corporate offices in the territory of the
United States.” Id. Further, these acts were not only carried out with the knowledge that torture was
occurring, but for the purpose of furthering the torture. Id. at 1194. For these reasons, Judge Martin
distinguished Cardona from Kiobel, and concluded the claims touched and concern the territory of the
U.S. to exercise jurisdiction. Id. At 1195.
86. Id. at 1191.
87. Id.
88. Jaramillo v. Naranjo, No. 10-21951-CIV, 2014 WL 4898210, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2014)
(discussing the importance of a territorial link between extraterritorial conduct and the U.S. in
Cardona).
89. Cardona, 760 F.3d. at 1194–95 (Martin, J., dissenting). Judge Martin cites to numerous circuit
and district court decisions. See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31
(4th Cir. 2014); Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, No. 2:09-cv-05395, 2015 WL 1669873, at *10 (D.N.J. Apr.
28, 2014); Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013); Sexual Minorities of Uganda v. Lively,
960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 323–24 (D. Mass. 2013).
90. Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2014).
91. Id. at 1233.
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distinction for the court in Baloco was that violations of the law of
nations merely originated, but did not occur in the U.S., and thus
were insufficient to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality.92 The Eleventh Circuit drew guidance from the
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Morrison v. National Australia
Bank,93 which discussed the presumption against extraterritoriality in
relation to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.94 The Supreme
Court in Morrison stated that the foreign conduct inquiry turns on
“where the transaction that is the focus of the statute at issue
occurred.”95 The ATS, unlike the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, does not focus on where a transaction occurs, but on what
types of conduct occur, regardless of location.96 The Eleventh
Circuit, using this reasoning, concluded that because the plaintiff’s
claims “are not focused within the United States,” the violations
touched and concerned the United States, but still lacked sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.97
The Second Circuit, took a similarly restrictive, but more brightline approach to the issue: “if all the relevant conduct occurred
aboard, that is simply the end of the matter under Kiobel.”98 Thus, the
importance of the extraterritorial inquiry for both the Second and
Eleventh Circuits turns entirely on the connection between the
relevant conduct and the U.S. territory, not the citizenship of the
corporate defendant. In these jurisdictions, it seems likely that if an
individual can allege that some relevant conduct took place in the
U.S., which is a violation of the Laws of Nations on U.S. soil, only
then is an ATS claim proper.
92. Id. at 1237 (“The fact that deceptive conduct originated in the United States did not defeat the
presumption against extraterritorial application.”).
93. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
94. Baloco, 767 F.3d at 1236–37.
95. Id. at 1237. In Morrison, the focus of the statute was the place where the securities were
purchased and sold. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267. The focus of a statute, according to the Court in
Morrison, is the source of Congressional concern in enacting the statute. Id.
96. Baloco, 767 F.3d at 1237.
97. Id. at 1238.
98. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Chowdhury v. WorldTel
Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2014) (overturning a jury verdict under the ATS
holding that because all relevant conduct occurred in Bangladesh, the plaintiff’s ATS claim should have
been barred by the district court judge).
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b. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits Take a Different Approach
Post-Kiobel
Along with Judge Martin’s dissent in Cardona, the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits stand in sharp contrast to the Second and Eleventh
Circuits interpretations of Kiobel. The Ninth Circuit, in Doe v. Nestle
USA, reaffirmed “a norm-by-norm analysis of corporate liability”
under the ATS.99 In Doe, the defendants allegedly visited the actual
sites of child slavery on the Ivory Coast several times a year for
training and quality control of their cocoa farms.100 Further, the
defendants lobbied against congressional efforts to curb child
slavery, although no child slavery actually took place in the United
States.101 The defendants in Doe argued for the court to use the
“focus” test in determining if conduct rebuts the presumption against
extraterritoriality.102 This test was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in
Baloco and explained by the Supreme Court in Morrison.103 The
focus test involves an inquiry into the connection between the
territorial events or relationships of the ATS and the United States.104
This inquiry centers on what relevant conduct the statute seeks to
forbid or regulate (the focus) and the physical location where that
conduct took place (the connection).105
The Ninth Circuit rejected the “focus” test for three reasons. First,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Court in Kiobel specifically used
the language “touch and concern” rather than “focus,” two similar,
but distinguishable, jurisdictional tests for extraterritorial conduct.106
Second, Justice Alito and Kennedy both noted that the opinion in
Kiobel left “much unanswered” in determining what sufficiently
touched and concerned the U.S.107 Third, the court noted that the
99. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014).
100. Id. at 1017.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1028.
103. Id.
104. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
105. Id.
106. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1028.
107. Id. at 1027–28 (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)
(Alito, J., concurring); Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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focus test relies on congressional intent and cannot be applied to ATS
claims, which are claims based substantively on international norms
rather than statute.108 The focus test in Morrison relies on a statutory
claim based on a statutory cause of action.109 Although the court in
Doe declined to define “touch and concern,” it held that when a part
of the conduct underlying the claims occurred within the U.S., a
viable claim is possible.110
In Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, the Fourth Circuit
found that torture allegations, although occurring exclusively in Iraq,
sufficiently rebutted the presumption based on four key factors: (1)
the defendant was a U.S. corporation, (2) the tort-feasors themselves
were U.S. citizens, (3) the contract and planning for the entire
business operation was executed in the U.S., and (4) oversight and
approval of tortious conduct from U.S. soil.111
The Second and Eleventh Circuit’s ATS standards under Balintulo
and Cardona, respectively, destroy the ATS by requiring the same
allegations that would make up a typical common law tort claim.112
Under this standard, tortious acts themselves must occur against
foreign nationals, on U.S. soil. This heightened standard would
render the ATS redundant in light of common law tort remedies.113 A
foreign national could simply bring a cause of action for common
law torts through diversity jurisdiction, without needing the ATS at
all.114 Most importantly, such a reading of the ATS in light of Kiobel
effectively disarms the statute as a viable cause of action, and
108. Id. at 1028.
109. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267.
110. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1028 (“Moreover, it would be imprudent to attempt to apply and refine the
touch and concern test where the pleadings before us make no attempt to explain what portion of the
conduct underlying the plaintiffs[‘] claims took place within the United States.”) (emphasis added).
111. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014).
112. See, e.g., Cole v. Turner, 6 Mod. 149 (1704) (the seminal case establishing common law assault
and battery); see also Wallace v. Rosen, 765 N.E.2d 192, 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (outlining intent
element of battery).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012). An alien may easily bring a suit under diversity jurisdiction against a
U.S. corporation as longs as the amount in controversy is greater than $75,000. Id. Further, “[a]ll fifty
states have some form of statutory action for the recovery of the wrongful death of another.” VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 591 (Robert C.
Clark et al. eds., 12th ed. 2010)
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destroys its statutory purpose in providing a venue for foreign
nationals to bring suits against U.S. citizens for torts committed
abroad.115
B. Practical Considerations: The Wild-Card Factor
ATS suits create particular “risks of adverse foreign policy
consequences” requiring courts to exercise caution in “impinging on
the discretion of the [l]egislative and [e]xecutive [b]ranches in
managing foreign affairs.”116 These considerations require a district
court to look to policy implications, not only precedential guidance,
in hearing a claim under the ATS.117 Specifically, there is concern
about the policy consequences of making a certain cause of action
generally available to all potential plaintiffs.118 Courts have not
specifically enumerated what kinds of practical considerations are
most important, but such policy decisions more aptly fall within the
individual judgment of the district courts.119 The general goal,
however, is to avoid “unintended clashes between our laws and those
of other nations which could result in international discord.”120 In
avoiding these unintended clashes, the Supreme Court suggested
looking to the legislature for guidance before expansion of the
ATS.121

115. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see also Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659,
1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating ATS is in part designed to prevent the “United States from
becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other common enemy
of mankind” (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004))).
116. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28.
117. Id. at 732–33. The Court explicitly stated in Sosa that determining if an international norm is
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action must involve practical judgment about the
“consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts.” Id. (quoting Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
118. Id. at 732–33.
119. Id.
120. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20–22 (1963)).
121. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
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C. Reconciliation and the Road Forward
The key to a proper suit by an alien against a U.S. corporation
under the ATS should require three factors: (1) U.S. corporate
citizenship, (2) tortious conduct controlled or directly financed from
U.S. soil, and (3) tortious conduct that is a clear violation of
international law pursuant to the International Criminal Court
(ICC).122 These three factors accomplish several goals, and follow
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Kiobel.123 First, U.S. citizenship
ensures that clashes between conflicts of laws do not occur under the
foreign policy concerns enumerated by the Court in Sosa.124 Second,
evidence of financing or oversight from the U.S. connects the
conduct to U.S. territory far greater than “mere corporate presence”
found by a company’s incidental domestic business.125 Additionally,
direct financing and oversight fits soundly within agency theory, or
aiding and abetting, which establishes corporate liability under
common law agency.126 Finally, utilizing the enumerated violations
of international law from the ICC is a simple and objective way to
determine when a substantive violation of the “law of nations”
occurs.127

122. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014); Al Shimari v. CACI
Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014).
123. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring). The
minority’s concurrence asserted that if the “defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affect[ed]
an important American national interest” jurisdiction is proper. Id. This factor by the minority treads
dangerously close to judicial activism the Court warned of in Sosa. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
124. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–28. In Al Shimari, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the defendant
companies were U.S. citizens, “[t]his case does not present any potential problems associated with
bringing foreign nationals into United States courts to answer for conduct committed abroad, given that
the defendants are United States citizens.” Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530 (citing Sexual Minorities Uganda
v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322–24 (D. Mass. 2013)).
125. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1192, 1194 (11th Cir. 2014) (Martin, J.,
dissenting) (allegations that tortious conduct was approved “from their offices in the United States” was
sufficient to state a claim that connected the U.S. territory to extraterritorial conduct).
126. See Nestle, 654 F.3d at 57.
127. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
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III. PROPOSAL
Courts seek to interpret statutes so every clause and word of a
statute, if possible, is given effect.128 To require allegations of
tortious conduct occur on U.S. soil, as the Second and Eleventh
Circuits do, reads the ATS in a way that gives no effect to the
Statute.129 This reading makes the ATS redundant with common law,
which already provides aliens a tort cause of action for typical
international law violations in federal courts through diversity
jurisdiction.130 International law violations such as torture,
extrajudicial killing, and other law of nations violations, if actually
committed on U.S. soil, are clear common law tort claims with no
need to invoke the ATS.131 Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Kiobel
noted that an important function of the ATS is to prevent the U.S.
from becoming a “safe harbor” from a common enemy of
humankind.132 Under the heightened territorial nexus required by the
Second and Eleventh Circuits, the judicial branch has essentially
overturned the ATS by requiring plaintiffs to show a heightened
territorial connection.133 As the Supreme Court recognized in Sosa,
the ATS gives aliens a remedy for torts committed abroad by a U.S.
national.134
One of the earliest examples of an incident the ATS was designed
to cover was a 1794 incident involving several American citizens
who “joined in a French attack on the British colony of Sierra Leone,
in violation of the United States’ official position of neutrality with
respect to France and Britain.”135 In response to the incident,
128. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107
U.S. 147, 152 (1883)).
129. See discussion supra Part II.C.
130. See discussion supra Part II.C.
131. See Ramsey, supra note 9, at 69 (arguing that “because federal diversity jurisdiction has no
territorial limit, aliens can sue U.S. citizens in federal court for foreign conduct (including conduct
which violates international law) as long as they meet diversity jurisdiction’s amount-in-controversy
requirement”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)).
132. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
133. See discussion supra Part II.C.
134. See id.
135. Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 596 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 U.S.
Op. Att’y Gen. 57 (1795)).
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Attorney General William Bradford stated, “‘there can be no doubt
that the company or individuals who have been injured by these acts
of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United
States,’ pursuant to the ATS.”136 In addressing this opinion, the Ninth
Circuit stated that General Bradford’s opinion was “too slender a
reed” to support an ATS claim based only on citizenship.137 Although
the Supreme Court found the Bradford opinion to defy a clear
reading and alone failed to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality, they hinted at oral argument, that the case would
be different if the defendant corporation Shell was a U.S. citizen,
rather than Dutch citizen.138
Some scholars argue in light of Kiobel, and the circuit court
decisions discussed supra, that the ATS is functionally dead.139 They
argue that alien plaintiffs should bring suit under a theory of
“transnational tort litigation,” rather than the ATS, because there is
no presumption against extraterritoriality.140 In that context, courts
apply state or foreign tort laws based on traditional choice-of-law
principles.141 Although transnational tort litigation may serve as a
viable alternative for plaintiffs, it ignores the bigger issue—the
destruction of a statutory cause of action by the judicial branch.142
Even worse, the judicial branch has not destroyed a statutory scheme
that is an antiquated relic of the eighteenth century, but part of a
larger statutory scheme that was expanded in 1991 as the Torture
Victim Protection Act (TVPA), which aimed to prevent human rights
abuses abroad by giving plaintiffs access to U.S. courts.143
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013).
139. See discussion supra Part II; see also Alford, supra note 39, at 1099.
140. Alford, supra note 39, at 1091. Professor Alford urges plaintiffs to reframe human rights
violations, previously brought under the ATS, as transnational torts because common law tort claims
have no extraterritorial presumption. Id.
141. Id.
142. See discussion supra Part II.C.
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350(2) (2014). The TVPA is a statute enacted in March of 1992 that gives a
civil cause of action in the United States against individuals who commit torture or extrajudicial killings
while acting “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.” Id. Plaintiffs
often state a cause of action under the TVPA in addition to an ATS claim. See, e.g., Doe I v. Nestle
USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014).
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In order to salvage the ATS, while recognizing the sensitive nature
of foreign policy concerns in ATS cases, district courts should look
to three factors in determining a viable cause of action under the
ATS.144 First, the violation, or primary conduct, must have been
overseen or financed in part from the U.S.145 Second, the defendant
must be a U.S. citizen.146 Third, the relevant extraterritorial conduct
must be a clear violation of the ICC’s Rome Statute.147
A. The Violation of International Law is Overseen or Financed in
Part from the U.S.
District courts should require plaintiffs to allege that a U.S.
corporation either (1) aided and abetted, or (2) conspired to commit a
violation of the Laws of Nations while on or from U.S. territory in
order to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.148 Aiding
and abetting violations of the Laws of Nations is recognized, even in
circuits least receptive to ATS litigation, as an accepted theory of
corporate liability.149
When a U.S. corporation actually aids and abets, or is involved in
a conspiracy to commit a violation of the law of nations, courts
should be less concerned about potential foreign policy implications
of projecting U.S. law onto conduct in a foreign country. Foreign
policy implications are a concern for district courts because of the
dangers of imposing U.S. law onto the actions of a foreign
jurisdiction.150 These dangers include conflicts of laws and
diplomatic concerns typically reserved for the executive.151 This
144. See discussion supra Part II.E.
145. See discussion infra Part III.A.
146. See discussion infra Part III.B.
147. See discussion infra Part III.C.
148. Int’l Crim. Ct. (ICC), Rome Statute, pt. 3, art. 25, § 3(c), ICC, Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July, 17,
1998), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/
RomeStatutEng1.pdf.
149. Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 179 (2d Cir. 2014).
150. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667 (2013). “[A]pplying U.S. law to
pirates does not typically impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within
the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign, and therefore carries less direct foreign policy
consequences.” Id.
151. Id. at 1669.
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foreign policy concern was one of the primary concerns for the
Supreme Court in Kiobel.152 Holding companies liable for aiding and
abetting, or a conspiracy that occurs on U.S. soil, alleviates this
concern because these suits do not impose U.S. law on foreign
conduct in a foreign jurisdiction.153 Rather, holding U.S. corporations
accountable for the actions of planning, financing, and oversight that
takes place in the U.S. means that U.S. law reaches only as far as the
corners of the U.S. corporate office.154 Although the international
violations themselves took place on foreign soil, the corporations are
liable for aiding and abetting those actions, or conspiring to commit
those acts directly on U.S. soil, not for the acts themselves.155
Even courts that have used the “focus” test, rather than the “touch
and concern” fact-based test, are satisfied under this territorial
connection.156 The focus of the conduct under the ATS is a violation
of the law of nations.157 The actual violation is the focus of that law,
and under the focus test, that violation must have a sufficient physical
nexus to the U.S.158 According to the ICC and pursuant to the Rome
Statute, it is a violation of international law if an individual aids,
abets or otherwise assists “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the
commission of such a crime . . . including providing the means for its
commission.”159
This conduct reflects the importance of direct financing originating
in the U.S. to the commission of the relevant conduct, a decisive
factor for the Fourth Circuit in rebutting the presumption against
152. Id. at 1664.
153. Grant Dawson & Rachel Boynton, Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting
Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 241,
250 (2008) (reasoning that the offense of aiding and abetting in the scope of liability is different in
liability as a direct perpetrator in that “one can be held liable for aiding and abetting genocide, even if
one does not share the specific genocidal intent of the principal perpetrator”).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
158. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2014). See also Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266–67 (applying the focus test in the context of the Securities
Exchange Act).
159. Int’l Crim. Ct. (ICC), Rome Statute, pt. 3, art. 25, § 3(c), ICC, Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July, 17,
1998), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/
RomeStatutEng1.pdf.
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extraterritoriality in Al-Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology.160 In
Al-Shimari, the Fourth Circuit drew an important distinction in the
contractual relationship executed in the United States for the
execution of the relevant conduct abroad.161 The execution of the
contract for security services in Al-Shimari was decisive in rebutting
the presumption because it directly provided financing, even if not
showing a purpose or intent to commit international violations.162
Similarly, conduct of aiding and abetting, or conspiring, that directly
finances or aids the commission of those violations serves the very
same purpose as a contract.163 It directly gives resources to the
commission of those international violations, even though one step
removed from the relevant conduct itself.164
B. The Defendant Must be a U.S. Citizen
The ATS aims to prevent the U.S. from becoming a “safe harbor”
for a common enemy of humankind by requiring that a corporate
defendant be a U.S. citizen.165 The potential for adjudication in
alternative forums for foreign corporate defendants and availability
of extradition of foreign natural persons also helps alleviate the “safe
harbor” concern.166
In requiring a defendant to hold U.S. citizenship, district courts can
avoid implicating the political question doctrine and other foreign
policy concerns surrounding an ATS claim.167 U.S. citizens, whether
corporate or personal, implicitly accept the rules and laws of the
jurisdiction where they reside.168 Unlike a corporation merely traded
160. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014).
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. United States v. Hodorowicz, 105 F.2d 218, 220 (7th Cir. 1939) (“[A]ny one who assists in the
commission of a crime may be charged directly with the commission of the crime.” (emphasis added)).
164. See id.
165. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring).
166. Id. Justice Breyer suggested that principles such as “exhaustion, forum non conveniens, and
comity” were potential safeguards to unnecessary ATS litigation or other concerns about the correct
forum. Id.
167. See supra notes 23–24.
168. See Yates v. Bridge Trading Co., 844 S.W.2d 56, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the doctrine
of internal affairs “provides that the law of the state of incorporation should be applied to settle disputes
affecting the . . . structure or . . . administration of a corporation”).
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on a U.S. stock exchange or doing business in the U.S., a corporate
citizen of the U.S. accepts U.S. law and jurisdiction by voluntarily
choosing to live or incorporate domestically.169
A primary concern for the Supreme Court in Kiobel was the
availability of alternative forums that were fair and ripe for
adjudication:170 the Netherlands, where the corporate defendant Shell
was domiciled, and Nigeria, where the relevant conduct took place.171
When a corporation is a U.S. citizen, concerns regarding the
sufficiency of an alternative forum or forum non conveniens are less
likely in play.172
Therefore, if a defendant is actually a U.S. citizen two important
concerns are addressed. First, foreign policy concerns from bringing
a foreign company into U.S. court for foreign actions are minimized
because a U.S. company has accepted the governing laws and
principles of the U.S. based upon their choice to be domiciled
domestically.173 Second, forum selection concerns, such as forum non
conveniens, are reduced.174
C. Clear International Violation Based on the International
Criminal Court’s Rome Statute
The ATS requires relevant conduct that is “committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”175 This element
clearly identifies what relevant extraterritorial conduct is necessary to
state a valid claim under the ATS.176 Courts have traditionally held
that crimes such as torture, extrajudicial killing, and slavery were
sufficient violations of international norms, but have not agreed on a
unifying standard or body of law to look to in making this
169. See id.
170. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676.
171. Id.
172. See generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
173. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530–31 (4th Cir. 2014) (illustrating
how the Fourth Circuit narrowed the four factors from Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. down to the
two factors from Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Brown Services to arrive at the conclusion that although
the injury occurred abroad, it did not violate the ATS).
174. See generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
176. See id.
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determination.177 The ICC is the first and only treaty based
international court that addresses the most serious violations of
international law.178
The ICC is governed by the Rome Statute, which enumerates
international violations and their requisite elements.179 Given the
wide international support for the ICC, the Rome Statute provides a
clear choice for district courts to determine whether the
extraterritorial conduct itself is a sufficient violation of the Laws of
Nations.180 Furthermore, circuit courts already rely on the ICC and
the Rome Statute, although not solely on it.181 Utilizing the Rome
Statute rather than a wide-ranging historical analysis gives district
courts a predictable, bright-line rule for determining if the relevant
extraterritorial conduct is actually a violation of the law of nations.
CONCLUSION
In 1980, the Alien Tort Statute underwent a remarkable rebirth in
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.182 However, in 2013, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum limited its jurisdictional reach.183 The Court attempted to
limit the use of the ATS to extraterritorial conduct by applying the
presumption against extraterritorial conduct to the statute.184 This
presumption, however, has raised many questions about what U.S.

177. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880–81 (2d Cir. 1980); see also supra note 64, at 267.
“The Supreme Court has enumerated the appropriate sources of international law. The law of nations
‘may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the
general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.’”
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
178. About the Court, INT’L CRIM. CT. (ICC), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20
court/Pages/about%20the%20court.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 275–76 (2d Cir. 2007). The
Second Circuit stated that the Rome Statute is a particularly useful tool in discerning international law
because it is currently signed by 139 countries and ratified by 105, “including most of the mature
democracies in the world . . . [i]t may therefore be taken by and large . . . as constituting an authoritative
expression of the legal views of a great number of States.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
182. See discussion supra Part II.
183. See discussion supra Part II.
184. See discussion supra Part II.
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contacts are sufficient to exercise jurisdiction.185 In light of current
ATS litigation, it is important to balance judicial caution with hearing
ATS claims that have an attenuated U.S. link with equal concern for
destroying a statutory cause of action.186 District courts can safely
balance these competing concerns by requiring a showing of (1)
allegations of aiding and abetting through financing from the U.S.,
(2) U.S. citizenship of the defendant, and (3) a clear violation of the
ICC’s Rome Statute.

185. See discussion supra Part III.
186. See discussion supra Part III.
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